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A B S T R A C T
Conflict is the most intriguing aspect of contact linguistics. Throughout history ever
since the Tower of Bable was left unfinished, contacts between speakers of different lan-
guages have unavoidably resulted in conflicts between speakers of those languages. With-
out any doubt, the European Union (EU) – above all after the decision to enlarge the
community – has accepted the multidisciplinary symbolic function of language and cul-
ture as a basis for European political unification. Accordingly, European Union policy
makers have had to analyze conflicts caused by monolingualism and multilingualism,
all aspects of contact linguistics. Can these conflicts be solved, minimized or neutralized
by strategies of language planning, language policies and language politics? Initial re-
sults of European language policy strategies permit at least a cautious measure of opti-
mism and open broad perspectives for the future of a New Multilingualism which will
be discussed in our contribution.
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Introduction
Following suggestions for a classifica-
tion of multilingualism, this paper pres-
ents the problems confronting a Euro-
pean language policy in five propositions.
The terms of the fifth proposition – the
Europeanization of language policy – will
be examined more thoroughly in order to
scrutinize conflict avoidance strategies –
strategies which have already proven
useful in multilingual countries and
which may yet serve as a starting point
for a discussion on how to neutralize con-
flicts all over Europe. The subsequent
conclusions will try to demonstrate the
extent to which contact linguistics may
contribute to a politico-linguistic conflict
analysis within an extended Europe.
It would be like carrying coals to New-
castle if, at the beginning of the second
millennium, one were to plead for mul-
tilingualism from a Brussels perspective.
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In Brussels, multilingualism and multi-
culturality are everyday phenomena that
can be encountered in innumerable situa-
tions. What is new, however, is that the
inevitable interdependence of politics,
economy, media culture and language has
been acknowledged in the official lan-
guage planning of the EU that itself has
created a politico-linguistic instrument
by founding a »ministry« (Directorate Ge-
neral XXII) which – to some extent suc-
cessfully – tries to manage language is-
sues. This official body is responsible for,
among other things, cross-border acade-
mic exchange (Socrates, Erasmus, Tem-
pus, etc.) and for the handling of indige-
nous minorities (or “lesser used langua-
ges” as EU terminology puts it) which are
entangled in conflicts of historical and
socio-economic provenance. A long, over-
due and thorough analysis of these mi-
nority languages on the »Production and
Reproduction of Minority Language
Groups in the European Union« from
1996, known as the Euromosaic report,
enriched and reinforced contact linguistic
research in essential aspects. Language
planning and language policy have thus
become established in the cultural plan-
ning of European Union members in such
a way that they are now even recognized
by outsiders.
Some new perspectives of contact lin-
guistics that emerged in the mid-nineties
might have considerable impact on mul-
tilingualism in the next century and can
be summarized as follows:
1. Multilingualism is no longer an excep-
tion to the rule for European countries
with several languages, but – as in ma-
ny regions of Asia and Africa – is be-
coming commonplace. In many cases it
has already become a matter of course.
2. Whereas the predominant point of
view taken in post-war sociolinguistic
literature was that minorities turning
to bilingualism are in danger of losing
their mother tongue, multilingualism
today increasingly serves as a driving
economic force, creating more jobs and
improving the standard of living
(cross-border traffic, translation pro-
fessions, supranational employers).
3. Economic factors such as globalization,
promoting the major languages, are in-
conceivable without the strong tenden-
cies towards regionalization that provi-
de small and medium-sized languages
in all spheres of a multilingual envi-
ronment with new chances of survival.
4. Most recent developments have led
from decades of defensive attitudes on
the part of 'small' and 'very small' lan-
guages (German: kleine und Kleinst-
sprachen) towards a new line of rea-
soning that pinpoints the advantages
of multilingual minority speakers, em-
phasizes them in the context of a new
European discourse and thereby takes
the offensive: Multilingual speakers of
'small' languages no longer need to
deny their identity and exclusively as-
similate to the prestigious languages.
Their monolingual adversaries, how-
ever, will have to struggle much harder
than before within a multilingual,
multicultural Europe in order to enfor-
ce their opinion in a mono-directional,
i.e. monolingual way.
First Proposition
More than ever before, speakers in
the late nineties are confronted with
strong demands to move towards
a 'New Multilingualism'.
The European Union's initiative to ac-
knowledge and implement eleven official
and working languages is unique in the
history of mankind. Since the system of
eleven languages was introduced in 1995,
it has already borne fruit. Linguistic and
cultural discrimination within the Union
has since decreased rather than increa-
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sed. The trend towards multilingualism,
however, is not a modern concept. In his
most recent contribution on old Austria's
language policy1, Hans Goebl has pointed
out the deficient linguistic skills pervad-
ing contemporary Europe compared to
the post-medieval Holy Roman Empire of
the German Nation. In contrast to modern
heads of government, the Habsburg em-
perors could boast an amazing knowledge
of languages. The “less linguistically gif-
ted” among them mastered at least four
idioms, the “most linguistically gifted”
one nine different idioms or more. In light
of an almost 200-year move towards mo-
nolingualism, this comparison cannot but
produce meager results for our contempo-
rary leaders, inasmuch as Blair, Prodi,
Chrétien, Hashimoto, Clinton, Yeltsin,
Jospin and Kohl as representatives of
Great Britain, Italy, Canada, Japan, the
United States, Russia, France and Ger-
many can hardly be considered multilin-
gual.
Besides the lack of shining examples
in a new Europe, a range of socio-eco-
nomic and socio-political trends further
underline the necessity of a »New Mul-
tilingualism« in view of the century to
come:
1. The significance of nation states and
the sovereignty of their governments
has weakened considerably in recent
years. In most domains of society, res-
ponsibilities of national states have
been taken over by “Brussels” or per-
haps “Strasbourg” or ”Luxembourg”,
thus diminishing the authority of EU-
member states and their governments.
2. Neo-liberalism and internationaliza-
tion have fostered tendencies towards
rapidly advancing globalization that
undermines the options of specific na-
tional economic and cultural legisla-
tive opportunities on the part of the in-
dividual countries and reduces their
effectiveness.
3. In view of the linguistic and cultural
development in Asia and Africa, it be-
comes quite clear that due to the com-
paratively rapid rejuvenation of the
population pyramid – in contrast to
Europe and the U.S.A. – and also due
to the fact that several languages and
cultures co-exist as a matter of course,
multilingualism has become a global
standard, whereas monolingualism is
becoming the exception.
In a simplified and clear way mul-
tilingualism in Europe could be presen-
ted in the following manner: In the whole
of Europe, a total of more than 100 lan-
guages are spoken (Europe I); in the Eu-
ropean Union approx. 45 minority lan-
guages exist in addition to the eleven
official and working languages, making a
sum of at least 56 autochthonous lan-
guages (Europe II); after the expected ex-
tension to the east and southeast, the EU
will most certainly comprise more than
70 autochthonous official and minority
languages (Europe III).
Even without taking millions of mem-
bers of allochthonous groups into consid-
eration, such a confusing welter of lan-
guages and cultures can, if at all, only be
managed properly by a sophisticated lan-
guage planning and language policy. To
this end, two obstacles must be overcome
in advance, which otherwise could lead to
intercultural misunderstandings.
1) Terminology
The distinction that the English lan-
guage makes between language plan-
ning, language policy and language poli-
tics can be found in other European
languages as well (cf. the threefold Dutch
variety taalplanning, taalbeleid and
taalpolitiek). In German, however, the se-
cond term, the decisive one for a Euro-
pean language policy, has no equivalent,
since only Sprachplanung and Sprach-
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politik exist. In French, the hierarchical
element (planification linguistique) has
been pushed aside in favor of a convinc-
ing term (aménagement linguistique),
which is related to modern democratic as
well as ecolinguistic concepts and con-
tains the meaning linguistic household.
Because English, French and German in
the context of EU multilingualism are
primi inter pares and therefore decisive
factors in the development of a common
future language policy, the terminological
differences with respect to these topics
catch the eye.
2) Conceptualization
The first two contact-linguistic analy-
ses of smaller language communities
within the EU2,3 have shown quite clearly
that up to the present day, there has been
no overall European concept, not even an
overall European vision with respect to
the linguistic and cultural coexistence of
the 15 members of the Union. This is to
be expected, as two divergent conceptual
approaches which are hard to relate, let
alone amalgamate, are an obstacle to a
common attitude: Whereas a centralistic
concept of language policy can be assig-
ned to one group of states (France, for in-
stance), some federally governed states
(such as Germany) have opted for the
subsidiarity principle. Other states (e.g.
Great Britain) practice mixed forms of
these two principles.
These differences in concept are
highly significant, as decisions on lan-
guage policy based on a centralist princi-
ple will – firstly – depend on the existence
of national (language) legislation, which
will – secondly – be implemented hierar-
chically from top to bottom through ad-
ministrative channels.
Where the subsidiarity principle is ap-
plied, the “top” legislative level and con-
sequently the respective national laws
and decrees are often lacking (Germany
and Belgium, for instance, do not have
national ministers of culture). Political
decisions on language and culture are in-
stead made at the lowest possible level
(communal, regional, “Land”). Due to this
more or less contrasting conceptualiza-
tion, a central language policy on the part
of the EU from a Brussels point of view
that does not consider the particularities
of the historically developed structures is
hardly conceivable.
Second Proposition
Contact-linguistic models serve in a
special way to illustrate the multidis-
ciplinary nature of multilingual
phenomena.
Contact linguistics by definition has a
multidisciplinary nature, covers langua-
ge contact phenomena of different kinds
(linguistic and extra-linguistic) and con-
tributes furthermore substantially to con-
flict analysis and conflict resolution4,5.
In our opinion, four contact-linguistic
assumptions have a special significance
for the handling of language conflicts and
their neutralization:
1. There is neither contact nor conflict be-
tween languages, but between speak-
ers and language communities6,7. As a
consequence, the possibility of compar-
ing one single language in different
contexts (e.g. Italian in Slovenia and in
Switzerland) is highly restricted.
Having a multiplicity of causes, these
contacts and conflicts appear under
various forms – from the open out-
break of hostilities (Kosovo 1998) to
the sublimation of “subcutaneous” con-
flicts in societies with a strong need for
harmony (Scandinavia). A major cause
for the frequency of all kinds of con-
flicts in linguistic communities is the
asymmetry of any kind of multilingua-
lism. Congruent language communi-
ties with an identical number of speak-
ers, with languages that enjoy an iden-
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tical prestige and with an identical na-
tional product and a comparable stan-
dard of living, do not exist. Therefore,
contact without conflict is hard to find.
2. Even if the statement that there is no
linguistic contact without linguistic
conflict8 might appear somewhat exag-
gerated, there is – in the field of Euro-
pean languages – no contact situation
which cannot be described as a linguis-
tic conflict at the same time. Notewor-
thy in this context is Mattheier's view
of linguistic conflicts among monolin-
gual speakers9.
3. Contact linguistics usually considers
language as an essential secondary
symbol of underlying primary causes
of conflict of a socio-economic, political,
religious, psychological or historic na-
ture. Linguistic conflict thus somehow
appears to be the “lesser evil”, since
linguistic conflicts in many cases are
much easier to correct and neutralize
than conflicts that primarily have
socio-political and other extra-linguis-
tic causes. Politicalization and ideolo-
gicalization of the language factor fre-
quently lead to conflicts in which
language often appears to be a matter
of minor importance but is easily em-
ployed as secondary symbol. There is
an endless list of examples in contem-
porary Eastern and Southern Europe.
Bosnia-Herzegovina: Will a “Bosnian”
language arise next to Serbo-Croat
(abandoned in 1992) and its successor
languages Serbian and Croatian? Mol-
davia: Is it possible to maintain the
unity of a state, if the land is divided
by the same language into different al-
phabets (Latin and Cyrillic) and a dif-
ferent lexicon? Byelorussia: Can a lan-
guage survive in a young state, if only
10% of the school children are taught
in Byelorussian?
4. Contact linguistics not only demon-
strates that conflicts shouldn't only be
considered as negative but proves at
the same time that new structures can
emerge from conflicts, structures which
– in the case of minority speakers –
might be more favorable than the pre-
vious ones.
Third Proposition
Linguistic conflicts in Europe not only
have an historical character. They are
already preprogrammed for the future
by European language politicians.
Apart from the traditional language
conflicts of a historical origin, there are at
present conflicts between migrants and
indigenous populations, between auto-
chthonous and allochthonous groups
fighting for or against their assimilation,
integration, etc. These are “natural” con-
flicts that I therefore would like to distin-
guish from “artificial” conflicts created by
the introduction of new structures of (lan-
guage) policy. Discussion of such conflicts
leads us to a comparison of the old story
of Babylon with modern Brussels: 4000
translators and interpreters working in
currently 11 official and working langua-
ges in Europe II, often influenced and 'af-
flicted' by dozens of minority languages,
most of them fighting for their survival.
It's almost a mathematical problem: If
there are ten possibilities to use each of
eleven languages, that makes 110 combi-
nations – a number the Flemish artist
Pieter Breughel could hardly have taken
into consideration when he created his fa-
mous painting on the construction of the
tower of Babel, as his building does not
provide enough room for as many booths
for simultaneous interpreting as pres-
ently needed in the EU Commission. It
should be evident by now that the cre-
ation of a homogenous Europe in itself
does not guarantee the solution of con-
flicts, whether naturally evolved or artifi-
cially created ones.
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What then are the possible solutions?
1. The introduction of a planned lan-
guage (Esperanto, sign language) etc.;
2. The acceptance of a strong vehicular
language as a lingua franca (English);
3. The preference for a few major langua-
ges (such as German, French and Eng-
lish);
4. The maintenance of the status quo (11
official and working languages).
Can the present order (solution 4), i.e.
the acceptance of linguistic diversity, be
further expanded and continued? To avoid
Babylonian conditions, some restrictions
on the freedom of language choice will
certainly have to be put up with. The ex-
tension of the EU will have to disrupt the
pattern of the almost automatic acknowl-
edgement of national languages as com-
munity languages in favor of solution 3,
or yet another new one.
The problems in promoting and main-
taining minority languages encountered
by the EU ministry mentioned at the be-
ginning – an authority which had been
pursuing language policies for smaller
languages in cooperation with European
minorities (Directorate General XXII) –
clearly pinpoint the delicacy and com-
plexity of any commitment on the part of
a political authority.
There is no agreement on how many
minority languages and speakers exist in
Europe II (40 – 50 minorities, depending
on different contact-linguistic definitions,
with as many as 30 to 55 million speakers
from a total of 380 million “unionists” in
Europe II), nor on how to refer to them
(the term “lesser used languages” sounds
somewhat helpless and artificial and is
translated into French as »langues moins
répandues«, which is not entirely equiva-
lent), nor on common guidelines for a lan-
guage policy with respect to the language
communities, which – due to their histor-
ically developed social structures – can
hardly be compared. If the politicians
concerned with minority languages were
not adopting such an exemplary attitude
of reserve, new “artificial” conflicts would
almost be inevitable.
Fourth Proposition
The share of individual European
languages in the present language
conflicts varies. German as biggest
EU language plays a special part.
Although German with 95 to 100 mil-
lion speakers is the most widely spoken
language in Europe apart from Russian,
its secondary and tertiary role as a for-
eign language in school, as an original
language for EU tender procedures and
decrees, as a negotiating language in
multinational summits, as a colloquial
language in the European institutions –
in summary: as an international langua-
ge – catches the eye. This might be due to,
among other things, the comparatively
high conflict potential inherent in the
German language. Some examples will
suffice to illustrate this:
1. German is characterized by a high de-
gree of conflict imperilment, as its fre-
quency of contact is higher than that of
other countries. Today's Germany bor-
ders nine states; in most of its neigh-
boring countries, German is spoken
(either as a minority or as a majority
language). In at least fifteen states
(Europe II and III) German is the offi-
cial or a minority language.
2. As far as allochthonous minorities are
concerned, Germany experiences an
extremely high degree of conflict diver-
sification. Just consider the spectrum
of immigrants who for the past twenty
years have been striving for acceptan-
ce and integration. For those not famil-
iar with the situation it is certainly not
'easy' to distinguish the different terms
used with respect to these newcomers
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and – when the terms used display a
semantic similarity – to reveal the dif-
ferent ideological points of view inher-
ent or even hidden behind them. For
example: Fremdarbeiter (transit wor-
ker), Gastarbeiter (guest worker), aus-
ländischer Arbeitnehmer (foreign wor-
ker), Arbeitsimmigrant (immigrant
worker), Arbeitsemigrant (emigrant
worker), Umsiedler (resettler), Aus-
siedler (person repatriated), Spätaus-
siedler (late repatriate, person of Ger-
man origin repatriated relatively late
after 1945), Rücksiedler (returnee),
Asylant (person granted political asy-
lum), Asylsucher (person seeking polit-
ical asylum), Wirtschaftsflüchtling
(economic refugee), Migrant (migrant),
Remigrant (returning migrant), to
mention only a few. Intercultural com-
munication within Europe II faces an-
other misunderstanding with respect
to conflict revealing itself in the fact
that the other member countries (with
the exception of Luxembourg) do not
experience similar numbers of people
coming into the country. Consequently,
due to the lack of a comparable factual
and ideological background, a consid-
erable number of terms cannot be ade-
quately translated into their language.
3. Ideology obviously plays a particular
part in language contacts with Ger-
man. Germany's past – above all the
Third Reich and World War II – can be
seen as an historical conflict burden.
The construction of images (Dutch:
beeldvorming) or development of ste-
reotypes10 is all too familiar from the
entertainment industry. Since the fif-
ties (!), popular TV serials and sitcoms
such as Hogan's Heroes (USA, broad-
cast in 1998 in Central Europe on
weekdays on cable TV) or most recent-
ly Allo, allo (Great Britain, broadcast
in 1998 on different Western European
channels) are perfect examples of a bi-
ased black-and-white representation of
the Germans as simpletons – naïve,
stodgy scoundrels, wrapped up with a
touch of folkloristically underpinned
sympathy: a real gift for researchers
on attitude and prejudice. Because of
this kind of coming to terms with the
past (“Vergangenheitsbewältigung”) –
the acquisition of the language is – at
least for European students of German
– impeded by a concomitant extra-lin-
guistic burden that complicates access
to the German language.
4. German, the biggest minority lan-
guage in Europe I, II and III, is con-
fronted with totally divergent concepts
of the term “state” and contrasting po-
litical ideas, structures and hence mi-
nority conflicts. It must certainly not
have been easy for Germans outside of
traditional German-speaking countries
to find ideological common ground be-
tween their own culture and the cul-
ture of the host country, between previ-
ously socialist and western democra-
cies, between socio-economically un-
derprivileged majorities and majorities
taking part in the neo-liberal upswing,
as a quick glance at the list of the most
important countries with German as
minority language shows: Denmark,
Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy,
Slovenia, Croatia, Slovakia, Czech
Republic, Hungary, Romania, Ukraine,
the Baltic countries, Russia, Poland.
5. As a conflict of prejudice there becomes
apparent a learning conflict that starts
from the assumption that German is
particularly hard to learn. Objective
linguistic criteria of argumentation are
mixed with subjective ones as Herbert
Christ was able to demonstrate convin-
cingly11,12.
6. Furthermore, the acquisition as well
as the mastering of a German stan-
dard language is complicated by a con-
flict of pluricentricity. The words 'bu-
tcher' (English) and 'boucher' (French)
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have not one but several equivalents
that appear to be understood by all
German speakers. Only one of these
translations, however, belongs to their
respective – actively used – idiolect or
sociolect (Schlachter, Schlächter, Flei-
scher, Metzger etc.).
7. Finally, German presents itself as a po-
tential European conflict language, in-
asmuch as the qualitative and quanti-
tative underrepresentation on an
international level (cf. the use of Ger-
man in international organizations
such as UN, Unesco, but also in the
EU) in case of a socio-economic or polit-
ical disadvantage on the basis of their
relatively limited right of co-determi-
nation might cause tensions. For the
time being, however, the Germans are
demonstrating a high degree of disci-
pline, i.e. they refrain from deducing
any claim to power from the promotion
and funding of international institu-
tions and try to avoid most conflicts
that might result from linguistic dis-
crimination.
It would be desirable to analyze the issue
of “German in Conflict” presented here in
a multidisciplinary setting in order to de-
duce strategies to avoid conflicts. In a Eu-
ropean context – characterized by numer-
ous tensions and conflicts frequently cen-
tred around suppressed, underprivileged
or simply small language communities
(minorities) – the next objective should be to
try to put strategies which have contrib-
uted to a conflict neutralization to the test.
Fifth Proposition
A successful subsidiary language policy
in Europe II in view of conflict
neutralisation must be 'Europeanized',
that is, must become an integral part of
a European language policy.
Which concepts have multilingual
states in Europe developed, and which of
them have succeeded in leading multilin-
gual language communities towards a
more peaceful coexistence? In spite of to
some extent completely different starting
points in some cases, it is possible to dis-
cern several common concepts to which
countries like Belgium, Luxembourg and
Switzerland and the conflict avoidance
strategies used there have largely con-
tributed.
1) The territoriality principle
Many monolinguals think that in bi-
lingual countries all citizens speak two
languages. Bilingualism, however, might
better mean that two languages exist side
by side and enjoy – in theory, at least –
the same status and the same rights.
This so-called institutionalized multi-
lingualism is a consequence of the terri-
toriality principle that forces the people
living in a given region, declared as mo-
nolingual by the authorities in charge, to
use the regional language at least for offi-
cial communication. The territoriality
principle must be distinguished from the
personality principle. The latter allows
each speaker to use his or her mother
tongue or another language in all official
and private domains, regardless of where
he or she lives.
Although the rather inflexible terri-
toriality principle arouses criticism, it
does work quite well in several multilin-
gual countries, particularly in more pros-
perous ones like Canada, Belgium and
Switzerland. Initially these two princi-
ples of multilingualism were opposed to
one another – as was the case in Belgium,
where up until the 1960's, the personality
principle had prevailed. The linguistic
asymmetry in the country and the ensu-
ing high prestige of the Romance lan-
guage brought about a high degree of
Frenchification of the country. Most re-
markable are the results of the territo-
riality principle in the bilingual capital,
Brussels. Here, the notorious »liberté du
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père (!) de famille« (the freedom of the
head of the family to choose one of the na-
tional languages) was not abandoned till
the seventies. Instead of a bilingualised
structure, Brussels has now settled on
two parallel monolingual systems in the
official domains (education, administra-
tion, work place). In accordance with the
territoriality principle, the two major
parts of the country (Flanders and Wallo-
nia), with the exception of few language
border communities, are either monolin-
gually French or Dutch.
This implementation of the territoria-
lity principle was received by outsiders
with both aversion and admiration, as it
had obviously served to preserve a small
multilingual nation. In the case of Bel-
gium, the consequences for the individual
speaker nevertheless are severe: if social
advancement before the introduction of
this concept was inevitably tied to the
mastering of two languages (at least in
the case of the Flemish and German pop-
ulation), many spheres of today's life can
be managed in one language only – the
language of the respective region.
The Belgian government is highly sen-
sitive as to the consideration of the rights
of the individual language communities
in the country. Even very small minori-
ties are granted equal rights. One part of
the German-speaking minority in eastern
Belgium, amounting to less than 1% of
the total population, benefits from the
language regulation policy between the
two major parts of the country and is
more or less treated like the Dutch- and
French-speaking population. German
has become the third national language
all over the country. In Brussels' airport,
for instance, all signs display four lan-
guages – the three official ones Dutch,
French, German and in addition – as the
language of international air traffic –
English; and these consistently in this or-
der, to avoid any discrimination of one
language community. Also the police in
charge of Belgian motorways takes into
account all three national languages: In
case of a traffic violation the driver is first
granted the choice between three natio-
nal languages. The language chosen is
used for entry in the record.
Of course, such procedures are expen-
sive, but they seem quite sensible in the
context of conflict avoidance strategies.
How many other countries are prepared
to grant a language with as few speakers
a similar status? If that status were de-
nied, however, this kind of linguistic
asymmetry would eventually entail grea-
ter conflicts with an economic as well as a
political impact. With some restrictions
the Belgian way of handling conflicts may
henceforth be considered as a model for
language planning on the part of the Eu-
ropean Union.
2) De-emotionalization
Another favorable outcome of the lan-
guage dispute in Belgium is a certain
de-emotionalization of the language ques-
tion. But it is far from easy to strip lan-
guage and cultural conflicts of their emo-
tional elements. With the introduction of
the territoriality principle, the Belgian
legislators had hoped that strict language
regulation in a few basic spheres of life
would leave enough room for as much
freedom as possible in the use of lan-
guage in other areas. Whereas the mono-
lingualism mandated by the territoriality
principle in most multilingual countries
affects at least two domains (education
and public administration), the work
place has been added in Belgium. As al-
ready indicated, the language of a terri-
tory must be used in all formal contracts
between employers and employees. Ac-
cordingly, tensions resulting from a so-
cially determined language choice (if e.g.
a higher-ranking official used a different
language than the trade union represen-
tatives) are reduced.
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Along with language legislation, a
plan for federalization and regionaliza-
tion was developed in order to prevent a
centralized language planning policy fol-
lowing the French model. Since such re-
gionalized (in Belgian terms “communali-
zed”) language planning within the diffe-
rent language groups is implemented
only in a few but nevertheless decisive
spheres of life, the government adopts a
rather permissive attitude in other do-
mains and compensates for the strictness
of the laws on language and culture with
liberality and tolerance.
3) Language censuses
Instead of following the example of
North America and Russia, where the
population is assigned to the existing ma-
jority and minority languages according
to large-scale language surveys (“Cen-
sus”), Belgium has sought its own way in
numerical registration of minorities, pro-
ceeding on the principle that the rights
and duties of a majority or a minority are
not exclusively dependent on their num-
ber. That the size of a language commu-
nity is no longer the decisive factor in the
field of language planning entails that all
considerations with respect to the protec-
tion of a language community start from
the assumption that in order to achieve
equal rights, a numerically and socio-eco-
nomically underprivileged minority de-
serves more support than the majority it
is confronted with. Hence, the Belgian
government has abandoned numerical
language surveys as part of population
census, thereby certainly contributing
greatly to de-emotionalization.
As Belgium in this respect distinctly
differs from most other multilingual na-
tions, we will take a closer look at the
topic of language censuses, which seems
to be a crucial factor for conflict. We have
emphasized that bilingualism is always
asymmetrical, that bilingual people will
for some reason or other, depending on
their socio-economic status, their cultural
identity, etc., always prefer one language.
Therefore, a collection of data on bi- or
multilingualism in the form of a numeri-
cal survey of the speakers will hardly pro-
duce socially reliable information on a
particular region. In the census of 1933,
for instance, 93% of the inhabitants of
Martelingen/Martelange, a small bilin-
gual village near the border between Lux-
embourg and Belgium, claimed to speak
German, and only 7% declared themsel-
ves to be francophone13. In 1947, when
the last official census was conducted in
Belgium, the situation seemed to be re-
versed: The majority of speakers claimed
to be francophone, whereas only a few
percent regarded themselves as speakers
of German. The reason is all too obvious:
Most village residents were bilingual at
the time of both censuses, but in 1933
German from an ideological point of view
(in the era of fascism) was in favor,
whereas in 1947 – after the end of World
War II – the same language was not very
popular anymore. People found it more
“convenient” to turn to French. Therefore
quantitative data from a language census
in multilingual conflict situations should
be treated with some scepticism, as the
information on multilingualism which
they seem to deliver is often distorted by
extra-linguistic factors.
4) Positive discrimination
As a logical consequence of the prelim-
inary considerations on de-emotionaliza-
tion and language censuses, the focus of
interest now is the positive discrimina-
tion of language minorities – an aspect
which could be of considerable use for the
language minorities of a future Europe.
Positive discrimination means that mi-
norities are granted more rights and ad-
vantages than they would be entitled to
according to the proportional system, and
this in order to be able to develop their
potential for language maintenance and
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growth in ways comparable to that of the
majority.
In the case of asymmetric and particu-
larly institutionalized multilingualism
discussed here, the structure of the edu-
cational system should, if necessary, ex-
plicitly promote the minority in order to
give it a chance to produce similar results
to those of the majority. In practice, this
could imply the acceptance of smaller class
sizes for speakers of smaller languages in
school, or the provision of better pay for
teachers confronted with special “multi-
lingual” requirements. Because they are
weaker in terms of social prestige and
number, minority students should enjoy
more rights and advantages, so as to ob-
tain equal promotion prospects in the
long run.
Another form of positive discrimina-
tion is to reward all those who earn their
living in a bilingual surrounding. A post-
man in a multilingual town, for instance,
could earn more than his monolingual
colleague, because the requirements are
higher. This would obviously lead to an
improvement in prestige and status of
bilinguals.
5) Market economy and language
In the wake of the de-emotionalization
of the language dispute in Belgium, other
ways to avoid and resolve conflicts have
emerged. Today, the multilingual situa-
tion in Belgium can be described as par-
ticularly liberal in respect of the three na-
tional languages as well as the most
important foreign and neighboring lan-
guages. It now has become much easier
for individual speakers to choose the lan-
guage they need according to their per-
sonal and professional objectives. Indi-
vidual linguistic behavior and individual
language acquisition correspond to the
free market. In this way, multilingua-
lism, freed from numerous historical and
social prejudices, stereotypes and emo-
tions, could adapt to supply and demand.
In addition, there is a purely economic as-
pect: Brussels' function as a capital and
an international meeting point has fur-
ther increased the willingness among its
population to learn foreign languages,
since the mastering of additional langua-
ges pays off14. Thus, the Belgian example
shows that economically based language
choice, determined by supply and demand,
is a more successful motive for multilin-
gualism than a centralized language
planning policy which – being static and
therefore rather inflexible – poorly adapts
itself to ever-changing language needs.
Conclusions
After having discussed European, es-
pecially Belgian solutions to some of the
problems caused by the existing multilin-
gual situation, it must be emphasized
that there is no general model for mul-
tilingualism that can be implemented in
all cultures, for all countries and under
all circumstances. The specific context of
each multilingual situation must be mir-
rored in the regional and overall lan-
guage policy of the respective country.
Policy must be made to measure the lan-
guage community in question in order to
be able to correspond to the existing eco-
nomic needs. The different examples pre-
sented here indicate quite clearly that a
single politico-linguistic program for the
solution of the language problems within
a unified Europe is bound to fail. There
are no general, overall solutions. Lan-
guage policy must be adjusted to each
specific case, situation and context.
Common efforts of allochthonous
and autochthonous groups
Despite the fact that allochthonous
and autochthonous groups predominant-
ly draw attention to the comparatively
poor prestige of their languages and cul-
tures as a common disadvantage with re-
spect to the dominant group, up till now
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only very little if any cooperation in the
demand for linguistic rights is to be dis-
cerned in Europe on the part of these two
groups. The need for this kind of coopera-
tion, however, should be obvious, as com-
parable disadvantages require common
solutions. Undoubtedly, the new, often so-
cially defined minorities such as the mi-
grants, guest workers, returnees, expa-
triates, resettlers, refugees, emigrants
and transmigrants come to the fore of Eu-
ropean politics. All of these groups have
given rise to a new consciousness among
minority populations, resulting much
rather in a promotion of indigenous mi-
norities than in their suppression. They
as well share new trends such as a re-
naissance of dialects and minority lan-
guages. A new, regional consciousness,
aimed at smaller units – like the »small is
beautiful« movement of the sixties and
seventies – has succeeded in directing the
attention of researchers, politicians and
those in charge of cultural matters more
and more to minorities whose socio-cul-
tural and also economical-political signif-
icance cannot be questioned any further
in a culturally viable Europe.
Still, the attitude of majority groups
towards linguistic and cultural minori-
ties tends to be much more negative in
the case of allochthonous groups than in
the case of autochthonous minorities.
Confrontations between indigenous mi-
norities and dominant majorities on the
one hand and migrants and dominant
majorities on the other take place on dif-
ferent levels (social, political, economic,
cultural), even as discrimination on the
part of the majority makes itself felt in a
similar form.
In contact linguistics, only very few re-
searchers have investigated both minor-
ity groups in one go – in spite of the posi-
tive effects that might be entailed by
common action. In the Netherlands,
Switzerland and France, autochthonous
and allochthonous groups are described
and analyzed in entirely different ways,
due to ideological reasons or reasons in-
herent to research. In Great Britain, for
example, there is a lack of contact be-
tween those linguists concerned with the
so-called “decolonized” languages on the
one hand and the researchers analyzing
the Celtic languages in Scotland and
Wales on the other. Without any doubt,
the apparent extralinguistic differences
among conflict situations are a reason for
this lack of cooperation. Therefore it is
not surprising that there are hardly any
proposals for conflict resolution that aim
at neutralizing similar linguistic conflicts
among both groups.
Re-evaluation of the situation
This field of contact linguistic research
certainly is a growing and constantly
changing one. There are some obvious
reasons:
Firstly, the rural communities who
preserved the language and other iden-
tity marks of their minority were mostly
located at the periphery of the various
European states and for this reason often
considered as marginal in the past. If
they wanted to participate in welfare and
economic progress, they had to integrate
themselves into the process of urbaniza-
tion and industrialization. In the course
of this process – if it took place – they of-
ten lost their particularities, including
their language. Now, quite a few of these
communities find themselves in the heart
of a new Europe, as they are located along
the borderlines and therefore lie on the
new crucial contact axes. From a geo-
graphical and a geo-political point of
view, they are hence no longer in a mar-
ginal position. Furthermore, it may well
be that a supranational Europe will be
much more prepared to tolerate regional-
ism than the former national states. This
implies that these communities are now
undergoing a process of shifts in social
structure. This process must be analyzed
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from a contact linguistic viewpoint. For a
better understanding of what has been
and still is going on in some of these com-
munities, we should, above all, take a
closer look at those groups of speakers
who have managed to preserve their lan-
guage and tradition. Minority groups
such as the Catalans give a clear idea of
what can contribute to the maintenance
and promotion of a minority group. In
this context, local and regional develop-
ment deserves more attention.
Secondly, multilingualism in Europe's
major cities is a rather new phenomenon.
In some cases, it has already been exam-
ined more closely on an empirical level, in
others, a lot remains to be done in order
to improve the insight into contact-lin-
guistic developments. In this area, re-
search on prejudice incorporates linguis-
tics, and problems and conflicts can arise
from multilingual and multicultural con-
tacts. These can be sociologically explai-
ned by attempts of the dominant group to
secure social advancement for its mem-
bers, but also by a feeling of being threat-
ened as the arrival of other groups seems
to blur their own identity.
Thirdly, the problem of languages in
the European Union remains widely un-
discussed and therefore unsolved. What-
ever the solution will be – three, four,
eleven or more working languages – the
Europe of the future will not be monolin-
gual. The entry of the Scandinavian
neighbors – countries where English has
always been favored as a second langua-
ge – and Austria to the Union in 1995
could possibly change the linguistic bal-
ance of power in Brussels, Luxembourg
and Strasbourg and already has enliv-
ened the debate.
Fourthly, we must examine the lan-
guage conflicts along EU borders to for-
mer Eastern-Bloc countries, where lan-
guage seems to be developing more and
more into a symbol of resurgent national-
ism. Here, one has to distinguish between
conflicts with historical roots and those
which have been kindled artificially – for
reasons related to the redefining of bor-
ders, the foundation of new states or for
simply ideological reasons. Accordingly,
potential causes for language conflict ex-
ist not only in Europe but all over the
world as well. They frequently become
noticeable as polarizing tendencies: Be-
side cross-border associations (NAFTA in
North and Central America, EU in Eu-
rope II), nationalism and regionalism are
simultaneously growing (Euregio, the
Alps-Adriatic region, newly founded sta-
tes like Slovenia and Estonia, among ma-
ny others). History has taught us about
the possible consequences of the suppres-
sion of conflicts. Therefore, we contact
linguists should produce sensible contri-
butions to the analysis, description and
control of the complicated linguistic situ-
ations occurring every day in front of the
researcher's eyes all over the world.
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PRIJEDLOG NOVE EUROPSKE JEZI^NE POLITIKE
S A @ E T A K
Konflikt je najzanimljiviji vid kontaktne lingvistike. Tijekom povijesti jo{ otkada je
Babilonska kula ostala nedovr{ena, dodiri me|u govornicima razli~itih jezika neizosta-
vno dovode do sukoba izme|u govornika tih jezika. Europska Unija (EU) je, posebno
nakon odluke o {irenju zajednice, nedvojbeno prihvatila multidisciplinarnu simboli~ku
ulogu jezika i kulture kao temelj za europsko politi~ko jedinstvo. U skladu s tim, poli-
ti~ari Europske Unije morali su analizirati konflikte prouzro~ene jednojezi~no{}u i vi-
{ejezi~no{}u te sve vidove kontaktne lingvistike. Mogu li ti konflikti biti rije{eni, sve-
deni na najmanju mogu}u mjeru ili neutralizirani strategijama jezi~nog planiranja i
jezi~ne politike? Po~etni rezultati europskih jezi~nih politi~kih strategija dozvoljavaju
barem skromni optimizam i velike izglede za budu}nost »nove vi{ejezi~nosti« o kojoj se
govori u na{em prilogu.
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